Chapter 5

‘Secure Our Profits!’ The FIFA™ in Germany 2006

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FIFA: A REALIST “NEOCOMMUNITARIAN ENTREPRENEUR”

To engage in a meaningful critique of international football tournaments (or, soccer games as some disbelievers say) it seems to me that I need to embed its main shareholder, the Fédération International de Football Association (FIFA) and its main product, the World Cup, into current economics, namely into “actually existing neoliberalism” (Brenner and Theodore 2002). As Bob Jessop (2002) has shown, there might be promising reasons for doing so. In the case at hand the path begins in the mid-1970s and starts with João Havelange, a Brazilian business magnate who was then coming into power as the new FIFA President, and who felt himself responsible for turning FIFA into a global business company. He attracted multi-national brands, such as Coca-Cola and Adidas to lucrative sponsorships and sold TV rights, thus transforming the World Cup into big business in terms of global audiences, profits and spectacular surveillance and security (FIFA 2003; Darby 2003; Homburg 2008; Boyle and Haggerty 2009). “In no time, Havelange transformed an administration-oriented institution into a dynamic enterprise brimming with new ideas and the will to see them through” (FIFA 2003:6). Since “the mid-1970s FIFA has pressed ahead with the commercialization and professionalization of international football. In this way it has systematically extended its financial resources as well as its global radius of action and adopted a new definition of its duties” (Eisenberg 2006:59).

It is against this background that I analyze the 2006 FIFA World Cup (hereinafter referred to as the World Cup) as an example of the neoliberalization of sports in general and of the securitization of profits by means of surveillance in particular. As has been argued elsewhere (Eisenberg 2006; Eick 2010a), FIFA as a nonprofit-organization is not neoliberal in the strict sense (Brenner and Theodore 2002; Harvey 2005) but its practices conform to what Jessop (2002:461) has called neocommunitarianism. Neocommunitarianism incorporates the notions of limiting free competition, enhancing the role of the third sector (nonprofits), emphasizing social cohesion, and “fair trade not free trade” in order to serve a “common goal.” Based on the understanding of FIFA as a realist neocommunitarian entrepreneur, the purpose of this chapter is twofold. First, it argues for an understanding of FIFA as a neocommunitarian but neoliberalizing organization aiming at profit maximization through its main product, the World Cup. In the second section, the World Cup is taken as an empirical example of how and in which forms urban neoliberalization shapes and is shaped by FIFA. In other words, it addresses the commercialization of (public) space and its hierarchization. The mode of World Cup-production forms and is formed by urban space. The same holds true for the safety, order and security complex. Its strategies and tactics are analyzed in terms of humanware (i.e. people), software and hardware (i.e. technology and law). In essence, FIFA’s attempts to implement a security and surveillance assemblage is to be understood as a means to enhance profit.

The FIFA World Cup: A neoliberal “cash machine”
It is striking to what extent FIFA, as the head of the self-declared “football family,” has an impact and influence on state and non-state stakeholders before, during and after the World Cup. In the following section, the commercialization and securitization of urban space before, during and after the 2006 World Cup in Germany is analyzed.

Local governments under conditions of global neoliberalization have adopted, among other things, place-marketing, public-private partnerships, and new forms of local boosterism. Consumer attractions such as sports stadia, convention and shopping centers, plus entertainment “in the form of urban spectacles on a temporary or permanent basis have all become much more prominent facets of strategies for urban regeneration” (Harvey 1989:9). Given the well-known trend of the festivalization of the city since the mid-1980s (Häußermann and Siebel 1993) and given the intensified marketing of the “city as an entrepreneur” since the early 1990s (Duckworth et al. 1987), it is the temporal-spatial intensity of the marketing and commodification processes before and during the four weeks of the World Cup that is particularly significant. In marketing its main product, FIFA’s “cash machine” (Homburg 2008:35) makes use of its monopoly. In addition, FIFA’s important political role is based on the symbolically loaded meanings that national competitions such as football matches are said to represent (Boyle and Haggerty 2009) and is fuelled by FIFA and the host nations alike (Bundesregierung 2006; Brauer and Brauer 2007). The World Cup’s importance rests on the “social cohesion” the games are said to be able to provide by amalgamating different classes within a nation state under the rubric of a “national team,” or “football family.” Further, the games are expected to create a sense of national pride among the populace that should lead to an emotional welding of state residents into a Volk. By the same token, nation branding is part and parcel of displaying the home country as a superior economic, educational, engineering and enlightened location for business and industry. In 2006, for example, the federal government’s official World Cup slogan was “Welcome to Germany, Land of Ideas” (Bundesregierung 2006).

**FIFA Spaces: Neoliberal commercialization**

Mega-events such as the Olympics, World Cups, or even G8 summits are not only high-profile symbolically and emotionally laden happenings, but also key moments of urban entrepreneurialism (Harvey 1989). They are part of an intense inter-urban and national competition that operates on a global scale with direct impacts on the citizenry. Marketing these events now occurs in ways that accord with neoliberal urbanism, the commercialization of urban space, and new crime policies. As Mayer comments (2007:94), “With so-called mega-events, cities began to engage in subsidizing zero-sum competition. … Packaging and sale of urban place images have become as important as the measures to keep the downtowns and event spaces clean and free of ‘undesirables’ and ‘dangerous elements’ (such as youth, homeless, beggars, prostitutes and other potential ‘disrupters’).”

Different stakeholders immediately took advantage of these new strategies and even pressed for a leading role in “modernizing” the urban environment. While such mega-projects are meant to last, the legacy of mega-sport events is less obvious and follows a unique logic. Even though the Summer Olympics and its little sister, the Winter Olympics, are understood by (critical) scholars and city governments as opportunities for urban renewal (Cochrane et al. 1996; Essex and Chalkley 2004; Gold and Gold 2008) and although the Football World Cups serve similar purposes (Pillay and Bass 2008; Black 2010), the International Olympic Committee (IOC) and FIFA only occupy a city for a couple of weeks.

**Extending the footprint and the facilities**

FIFA extends its footprint by redefining its area of spatial control for advertisement purposes. Until 1998, for example, FIFA’s control rights applied only within the precincts of the stadia. In 2002, FIFA extended its sovereignty to the so-called controlled access sites, and since 2006, its realm included the event stadia, the fan miles, “and other official sites” (FIFA 2006b:39). Thus
for more than four weeks, host cities are transformed into oligopolized advertising spaces of
FIFA’s two sponsoring groups: the 15 “official partners” and the six “national sponsors” —
which combined, generated revenues for FIFA worth € 752.4 million in 2006 (Pfeil 2006). The
steady increase of profit generation over the years also holds true for selling broadcasting,
television and filming rights — revenue streams that produced € 1 billion (Salz and
Steinkirchner 2006).

In line with these commercially driven preconditions of spatial control which must be
accepted by all potential host cities, FIFA also asks for “clean” ground-advertising areas by
demanding that all spaces claimed to be within its realm are to be policed before and during the
tournament. In the case of Germany, 12 stadia, their respective vicinities, the 32 training
grounds and hotels, and the 12 official fan miles were specially delineated spaces. Such
demands included the “provision of detention rooms,” and video cameras “with a zoom facility”
to be “installed inside and outside the stadium” (FIFA 2007a:11). Stadia surroundings and the
official fan miles were also to be fenced (FIFA 2009:6). Furthermore, FIFA’s demands
extended to “guaranteeing, planning and implementing law and order as well as safety and
security in the stadiums and other relevant locations in conjunction with the relevant
authorities” (ibid.:10).

FIFA’s Official Provider Licenses meant that German beer or sausage were not to be
available in the stadia, as beer and fast food rights were held by Anheuser-Busch (Budweiser)
and McDonald’s. On the 12 official fan miles, the winning sponsors were expected to have the
exclusive right to pitch their products when matches were on, and it was only due to protest by
the German Organizing Committee (OC), pressured by German companies, that a compromise
was found that allowed the sale of selected non-sponsor products (Baasch 2008:56). Neither the
German application form for the World Cup (dating from 2000) nor the FIFA Pflichtenheft
(functional specifications) of 2003 mentioned the fan miles — and therefore all regulations
pertaining to these spaces were negotiated ad hoc (Schulke 2007). Immediately after the World
Cup, however, when it became clear that the fan miles were an economic success, FIFA
announced that it was taking over organization and marketing of these events in the future
(Schulke 2007:51-52), and had already created the trademark Fan Fest (FIFA 2010). Even
though the cordoned-off zones around the stadia were called “security rings,” their main
function was to provide sponsors and the media with exclusive hospitality zones (FIFA
2007b:121-163). These purported security rings extended, as Klauser (2008) rightly observes,
far beyond the stadia and the inner cities. Nonetheless, to reiterate, FIFA (2006a:2) does not
focus on security but on profit: “official training grounds used by the 32 teams must be handed
over to the OC free of advertising materials ... Specifically, fixed perimeter advertising must be
covered or removed by the operator of the facility.”

To sum up, “for the good of the game” FIFA demands that applicants and host cities have
the ability to secure and police FIFA’s profits. This is not to say that FIFA is not interested in
“peaceful,” safe and secure games and uses volunteers, state funded police, military, and private
security guards towards that end. But all this security activity is centered on increasing profit. In
the following, I focus on the commercialization of the fan miles and the “hospitality rings”
around stadia.

**FIFA Spaces: Commercialization in the field and in the rings**

As shown above, FIFA forces all applicants for hosting the World Cup (the nation state as well
as the respective host cities) to accept in advance all branding conditions and commercialization
interests laid down in the so-called FIFA Regulations (FIFA 2006a). From 2002 onwards, FIFA
itself extended its right to control urban space further, thus seeping even deeper into
neoliberalizing cities. In other words, a nonprofit organization, FIFA, opens up a space for the
profitability of itself and of some of the world’s largest multi-national companies.
According to Klauser (2008:181), the security rings around all stadia had to be handed to FIFA as “neutralized space” with all preexisting advertisements removed. Rules and regulations for the commercialization around the stadia not only applied to the official sponsors but, in turn, also against their competitors. As Klauser (2008:181-182) notes, even local car garages had to remove advertisements and restaurants had to hide their exterior beer signs (to protect Budweiser). In Munich and Hamburg, for instance, cranes were used to remove the huge advertisements for the insurance corporation Allianz and the online marketing company AOL Germany (Wilson 2006). As FIFA states, the “OC, FIFA and the stadiums/cities have simply created “controlled areas” — on an individually agreed basis — in the direct vicinity of the stadiums. In these areas no alternative events should take place ... to ensure the seamless organization of FIFA World Cup fixtures” (FIFA 2006b:1).

Hence, we cannot only speak about the “wedding” (Homburg 2008:41) of football, television and the sports industry but about the wedding of commercialization and securitization as well. It is not only sponsors and non-sponsors, the urban and non-urban citizenry who are affected by FIFA’s regulations, but also all administrations from the global to the local scale. The influx of FIFA on regulating urban space as a market and commodity already raises concerns about the democratic conditions of the commonweal before, during and after this mega-event — as it does in terms of security. It is to this topic the chapter now turns.

THE FIFA WORLD CUP: A NEO-LIBERAL SECURITY GAZE

Neoliberalization promotes a shift away from Fordist-Keynesian forms of government to forms of governance more focused on managing and organizing devolved centers and resources, negotiating “both policy and implementation with partners in public, private, and voluntary sectors” (Stoker 2000:98). Whereas the role of the (nation) state, according to the well-known metaphor of Osborne and Gaebler (1993:25), has shifted from “rowing” toward “steering,” private industry, and, as FIFA shows, nonprofits as well, thereby achieve greater influence. As part of this development, security functions previously regarded as the domain of the state have been privatized and outsourced, and these shifts in governance and the resulting proliferation of market opportunities are closely connected to the growth of the private security industry (Eick 2006). Even more interesting, FIFA does not only set the commercial rules but the preconditions for security settings as well, suggesting that FIFA demands that host cities “row” in different ways.

Delegating, defining and dividing risks

Several scholars (Ericson and Haggerty 1997; Ericson 2007; Boyle and Haggerty 2009) claim that a more market-oriented and individualized view of security means that consumers are to a specific degree more responsible for their own security, both in terms of their behavior and in terms of making provisions for their own protection. The well noted prevalence of risk-based thinking, of a suspicion-fueling “precautionary logic,” and the state’s demand to meet its expectation that everyone, at best, should police herself, however, does not at all apply to FIFA. In fact, the opposite is true as all policing forces, all policing technologies, all World Cup-related safety insurances (FIFA 2006a, 2007a, 2007b), in fact all risks, so to speak, are to be covered by the state and have thus been delegated. If we are to understand the term “steering” as, among other (intellectual) activities, the practice of defining, the “football family” has been able, with the UEFA taking the lead as early as 1982 (Tsoukala 2009:29), to define risks. From the 1990s onwards, bans on alleged hooligans spread all over Europe, creating what has been called “legal vagueness” for football fans (Tsoukala 2009:105) and backed by a 2006 European Council’s decision that a “risk supporter” can be regarded as a person “posing a possible risk to public order” or the possible risk “of anti-
social behavior” (cited in Tsoukala 2009:109). The highly contested German data bank Gewalttäter Sport (containing the personal details of sports related violent offenders), introduced in 2000, was even declared unlawful by the Higher Administrative Court in December 2008, but is still operating (Deutscher Bundestag 2009:2; Deutscher Bundestag 2010:1-3).

The power to define and delegate risks does not necessarily mean that FIFA is non-cooperative. In times of networked governance, the opposite is true. This is not surprising as FIFA is in line with the strategies (and even part and parcel) of urban and global elites (Sugden and Tomlinson 1998; Slanskyj 2008). Even though host cities pay in economic terms, because hosting World Cups is not lucrative for host cities (Bundesregierung 2006), they (aim to) earn in terms of “social cohesion” and ideology (Brauer and Brauer 2007).

In addition, the state-led new crime prevention approaches such as redefining cleanliness and order, socio-spatial rather than individual orientations, and the “punitive turn,” are shared by FIFA, the hosting cities and states alike. In as much as public inner-city spaces and mass private property are “sanitized” and strictly controlled (Kempa et al. 2004; Flint 2006), the stadia and the fan miles are standardized and people who want to use such spaces have to meet “normalized” behavioral standards (Görke and Maroldt 2006; FIFA 2007a). Whereas the “deviant individual” or the “dangerous classes” used to be the state’s central regulatory preoccupation until the mid-twentieth century, it is now more the spaces those individuals and groups occupy that are focused on in hopes of controlling troublesome behavior (Belina 2007; Eick 2011a). For example, the homeless in Vancouver learned from the Winter Olympics about the exclusionary and repressive effects of mega-events, orchestrated by private security companies and the police’s increased use of “infraction tickets” (OHCHR 2009:18; Zirin 2010). Measures aimed at “undesirables” such as (foreign) youths, the homeless, prostitutes, or panhandlers (including increasing incarceration rates) were also evident in the 2006 FIFA World Cup (see below), or the 2008 UEFA Cup in Austria and Switzerland (Klauser, this volume).

Such shared attitudes include new forms of cooperation such as “police-private partnerships” (Stober 2000), the mobilization of civil society in the form of volunteers (Moreno et al. 1999; Emery 2002; Bach 2008:151-154), and the substitution of humanware by software and hardware (Aas et al. 2009), plus an interest in elaborating tactics of “strategic incapacitation” (Noakes and Gillham 2006). All these practices reverberate in the rules and regulations that FIFA (2006b, 2007a) imposes, as the following section shows.

**FIFA Rules: Securitization in the field**

FIFA’s rules and regulations for behavior standards in football stadia resonate with the redefinition of deviant behavior, the return of order as an issue for crime fighting, and the creation and redefinition of new crimes and disorderly behavior by (local) administrations. The zero-tolerance politics deployed worldwide (Smith 1996), the Anti-Social Behavior Orders in the UK (Flint 2006), the area bans for “undesirables” in Germany (Belina 2007), the policing of the urban poor by rent-a-cops (Eick 2006) and nonprofits (Eick 2003) serve as ample evidence of this trend.

The 2006 FIFA World Cup in Germany saw the largest display of domestic security strength since 1945. During the four weeks of the World Cup in June and July, more than 220,000 police officers from the 16 Länder, an additional 30,000 from the Federal Police, an unknown number of secret service officers, 7,000 military guards, and about 18,000 rent-a-cops were deployed (Buhl 2006). In addition, more than 20,000 security screened citizens took part in security and safety measures as either stewards or volunteers (Görke and Maroldt 2006:3). A notable exchange of German police officers with colleagues from neighboring countries occurred and more than 500 foreign police were used (Bach 2008:151), cutting across national borders and, thereby, neglecting any constitutional restraints in the respective countries. Finally,
FIFA has its own internal policing entity, the Task Force “For the good of game” which, in 2007, was transformed into a new body (the “Strategic Committee”) in order to “to resolve problems within the family, rather than let rulings be made by a judge who comes from outside the world of football” (Platini 2007).

This overall effort was supported and mediated by sophisticated surveillance, information, identification, and communication technologies — the security “hardware” and “software” of the World Cup. These included: 200 data banks containing more than 18 million data files (Averesch 2009:6); RFID ticketing systems; and video surveillance systems that monitored stadia and their surroundings, hotels hosting the teams, and public viewing zones in the host cities (see below). The police also used Automatic Vehicle Location systems; Sniper Locating Systems; and robots — equipped with video cameras, radar sensors, temperature gauges and infrared scanners to detect potential bombs and explosives in Berlin, Frankfurt, and Leipzig (Eick et al. 2007). Tournament venues and their environs as well as public viewing locations in downtown areas were converted into high-security zones with access limited to registered persons and pacified crowds only. Even selling sausages became a security issue.

About 150,000 persons who applied for jobs during the tournament were security-screened by secret service officers and the respective computer systems in order to be accredited (Eick et al. 2007). In addition, NATO provided airspace surveillance with two Airborne Warning and Control System planes (AWACS) on loan to the German government to control airspace over the host cities. In US military terms this entailed a complete C4ISR system (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance).

**FIFA Rules: Civil Rights and Liberties**

Even though the 2006 FIFA World Cup was heralded as a total success both by the government and media in terms of organizational capacities and image production (Bundesregierung 2006; Brauer and Brauer 2007), human rights groups and fan clubs raised questions about how the event impacted on civil rights (Eick et al. 2007).

The aforementioned data bank Gewalttäter Sport was used during the 2006 World Cup to ban people from stadia and public viewing zones and, during the 2008 UEFA Championship in Austria and Switzerland, to ban people from entering those countries. Data were also transferred to the respective police forces (Tsoukala 2009:111-116), as the number of persons whose data are stored in the German data bank grew from about 6,500 in 2004 to 9,400 in 2006 to 10,711 in 2009 (Deutscher Bundestag 2009:3; Deutscher Bundestag 2010:1). According to the German government, 12,149 data files on German hooligans were available before the 2006 World Cup. According to the police, partnering police organizations provided an additional data bank of 9,000 data files on foreign “hooligans”: 8,450 German “hooligans” were contacted by the police at home or at their workplace; 3,200 local banishments from inner cities, public viewing areas, and stadia were declared; 131 stadia bans were issued on-site and 587 purchased tickets were blocked based on existing stadia bans; an additional 910 notification requirements were issued; and 210 persons were sent into temporary custody. Finally, 370 people were refused entry into Germany (data collected by the author).

In as much as “private logics circulate through public institutional domains” (Sassen 2006:195), rent-a-cops and volunteers have become part and parcel of the “policing family.” Between 900 and 2,300 rent-a-cops, called supervisors and stewards, were deployed per game as were, on average, 1,370 private security officers. An additional 300 volunteers were deployed per game in the security zone (in total about 20,000). The total number of about 18,000 rent-a-cops — coordinated in a consortium that, in effect, regulated competition between the companies in a neocorporatist way — came from 12 different companies (Buhl 2006:202). All in all, 87,680 security personnel were deployed just to secure the matches.
Whereas it was possible to collect information from the police about their banning practices, we know nothing about the bans issued by their for-profit and nonprofit counterparts (Bundesregierung 2006; Bach 2008) beyond journalistic evidence (Görke and Maroldt 2006:3). According to Bach (2008:152-153), the 12,000 security volunteers were divided in sub-groups for information services outside the stadia and to provide information, guidance, safety and security services within the security rings around the stadia (entrance regulation, grandstand control, lost-property office). They were “integrated into a stringent hierarchy, organized in small groups with a team leader” and were “under control of the local FIFA security officer.” In addition, FIFA developed guidelines to encourage cooperation between the rent-a-cops (supervisors and stewards) and the volunteers that read: “The security and order staff is authorized to direct the volunteers and, depending on the situation, is allowed to integrate them into the security and order tasks” (cited in Bach 2008:154). In general, the security responsibilities of the state police and commercial and volunteering security forces were spatially divided. Private security officers were deployed on private space (stadia) and temporarily privatized space (fan miles) in order to provide information, to control entrances, to conduct bodily checks, to coordinate parking lots, and to control tickets (Schmidt 2007:28). The monopoly on the legitimate use of force, at least officially, remained in the hands of state police who primarily controlled public space and, depending on the host city, the fan miles as well.

In Hamburg, for example, the police controlled the public viewing area at Heiligengeistfeld. In Berlin a private security company controlled the fan mile Straße des 17 Juni, with only a few police officers in the public viewing area, although the police were on constant standby with additional squads in the surrounding areas (Falkner 2006:12). In addition, the Berlin police held sway with their demands for higher security measures at the Berlin fan mile which was enclosed by a 5.3 kilometers long and 2.20 meters high fence – with the additional monies for such fencing being paid by the Berlin government (ibid.). With regard to the governance of local security, what emerged in and around the fan miles was a security mix of state and private policing bodies both financed with public monies during a commercial event.

Concerning the spatial reorganization of urban space, as Klauser (2008:178) has shown, fan miles concentrated fans in selected areas in the city, and in doing so classified, separated, symbolically marked, materially arranged, and in essence controlled public space, which extended to harboring specific norms, values and constraints. It is true that most of the fan mile organizers did not ask for an entrance fee, and only Cologne, Munich and six additional non-host cities relied on admission fees (Klauser 2008:179) and buying drinks was not a precondition to watch the matches. Nevertheless, the claim of the German criminologist Thomas Feltes that “the World Cup has been democratized by public viewing” (2006:9) is at least confusing if not irritating. On the contrary, what emerges during the World Cups in the host cities is in fact the spatialized suspension of democracy. Of particular public concern was the wide-ranging video surveillance assemblage established during the tournament. For this reason the next section analyzes the devices that were deployed and what remained afterwards in terms of securitized urban space.

**FIFA Rules: Securitization and video surveillance, before, during and after the World Cup**

Compared to countries like the UK or France (Norris and Armstrong 1999; Töpfer and Helten 2005), Germany’s video surveillance coverage has only a limited reach into public areas. Due to the “right to informational self-determination,” readjusted in 1983 (Töpfer 2007: 214), Germany still legally constrains the use of video surveillance in public space. The right to informational self-determination includes the provision that there should be no surveillance without informed consent except in the “prevailing general interest” and with a clear legal basis to be codified in a federal statute. In addition, according to most state police acts, public area video surveillance
shall be limited only to “crime hot spots” (Töpfer 2007). Notwithstanding such ostensible constraints, video surveillance is a reality.

From the 1990s onwards, the World Cup has entailed modernizing police equipment and extensive training in video surveillance-mediated crowd control (Töpfer 2007). In June 2000, when FIFA decided that Germany would host the World Cup, public area video surveillance was operating in only four cities, all of them in Eastern Germany. In May 2005, the National Security Concept was publicized and the Ministry of the Interior called for intensified video surveillance and a (not realized) facial recognition system, but left decisions about implementation and costs to the Länder and local authorities. In February 2006, the Länder-Ministers of the Interior appealed to the respective hosts of public viewing events to deploy video surveillance but did not make it a mandatory condition. In May 2006, video surveillance systems were operating in around 30 cities.

Video surveillance has been the core of the national railway company’s (Deutsche Bahn) 3S-system (service, security, cleanliness) since 1994, shortly after the company was privatized. In addition, video surveillance networks operate in most public transport systems of all major cities, some of them modernized in preparation for the World Cup (Töpfer 2007). New video surveillance systems were installed, or existing ones modernized, in all stadia of the First and Second Football League before the World Cup in order to meet the demands of FIFA; the new Allianz Arena (opened in 2005) in Munich, for example, is fully equipped with an interconnected RFID and video surveillance system (Beier 2006). The German company Siemens installed the vast majority of video surveillance and entrance control systems in these new or modernized World Cup stadia (Siemens AG 2006).

Permanent video surveillance of public areas was in operation in only 6 of the 12 host cities. Only Hamburg’s new video surveillance systems were installed in conjunction with the World Cup, something that occurred in April 2006 (Baasch 2008:79). Kaiserslautern saw the police roll-out of a temporary extensive public area video surveillance network, consisting of almost 180 cameras (Schmitt 2006:20), of which 10 remained in public space after the event concluded (Gastauer 2006:4). According to media reports, Hanover deployed 870 cameras (cited in Baasch 2009:158), and all official fan miles were fenced and controlled with video surveillance. But the majority of the 2,000 officially registered public viewing events were organized and secured without video surveillance.

Most video surveillance systems at public viewing areas were dismantled after the World Cup because of legal constraints and costs. At the same time, the World Cup helped to modernize, expand (and centralize) video surveillance systems in major sports stadia, at the railway stations of Deutsche Bahn and in urban public transport networks, such as those in Frankfurt, Hanover and Munich. The FIFA World Cup can thus be seen as a catalyst for a neostatist security strategy: with an increasing number of actors being enrolled into the socio-technical network of video surveillance and, in particular, into public transport networks, co-opted by the police. All in all, and given other research on the topic (Boyle and Haggerty 2009), we see the continuation of a trend. World Cups have a catalytic function for video surveillance networks where the interim endures and even extends, such as occurred in Athens after the 2004 Olympics (Samatas 2007).

Conclusions

Mega-events seem to fuel the growing acceptance of and conviction that rent-a-cops (Buhl 2006) and volunteers (Bach 2008:151-154) are needed to serve security functions. The same seems to be true for the globally active nonprofit FIFA. The growing influence (not necessarily the acceptance) of all three stakeholders, FIFA, rent-a-cops and volunteers, continues a trend that has been witnessed since the early 1990s in Germany as all stakeholders enjoy growing
decision-making powers. FIFA is now part and parcel of the neoliberal crusade of global and urban elites.

Nonprofits gain greater influence by merging policy fields such as sports, social welfare, labor-market (re)integration and the local mingling of security, order and safety measures (Eick et al. 2004, Eick 2011a). During the World Cup, nonprofits also intensified workfare measures against the long-term unemployed and deployed them as additional security staff (Feltes 2006:10-11). Finally, private security companies were able to extend their fields of operation due to ongoing outsourcing processes (Eick 2006).

I have argued for an understanding of FIFA as a neo communitarian realist entity. Backed by Swiss nonprofit legislation, it aims to limit free competition within its realm and is willing to contest public law. FIFA constantly tries to extend and enhance its influence within its community and — at least before and during the World Cups — beyond. It emphasizes its political role, making use of the (nationalized) “social cohesion” function that football ostensibly plays. By thinking globally and acting locally, FIFA has become an important “glocal” stakeholder (Swyngedouw 1997) within sports and fashion, marketing and media, politics and propaganda, even nation-building and nation-branding, and on the ground at the urban level. In addition, the aforementioned Swiss nonprofit legislation makes FIFA tax-exempt worldwide ensuring that it can collect billions of Euros without having to provide any return service to the host nations and cities.

After the event was over, what remained in place were new laws to extend executive power and sophisticated new surveillance technologies. The government of Hesse, for example, amended the Police Laws to allow for the greater use of video surveillance systems in public space, to extend custody for suspects from 48 hours to six days, and to allow for automated number-plate recording and wiretapping (Nedela 2006:8). The FIFA World Cups also provide an exceptional experience in comprehensive training for (inter)national security, including military, private security companies, nonprofit organizations, and volunteers. This security gaze has subsequently been transferred to the 2008 UEFA Championship in Austria and Switzerland (Kretschmann 2009; Klauser, this volume), to the 2010 World Cup in South Africa (FIFA 2007a) and to the 2010 Vancouver Winter Olympics (Boyle and Haggerty 2009; Eick 2011b).

Finally, in order to prepare for transnational protest (della Porta et al. 2006), experiences from mega sports events have been transferred across the globe through a constantly growing expert network that is reflected in the enduring fragments of designated temporary surveillance networks in different settings (Boyle, this volume). Such networks have contributed to the ongoing militarization of urban public space (Eick et al. 2007; Neumann 2007:3; Führungsstab Bundespolizei 2007:4).

In summarizing, I want to highlight four points. First, FIFA is a nonprofit organization that shapes and is shaped by “actually existing neoliberalism.” Its main business is to market a purported civil society activity, playing football, and to transform it into a profitable commodity. In managing and marketing the World Cup, it shapes the social meaning of the game as it is shaped by its main product. Given its nonprofit status, FIFA deploys a particular kind of neoliberalization — a highly regulated and constantly readjusted process containing elements of neocommunitarian thought and practice. Second, from 2002 onwards, FIFA has set the rules and regulations for its mega-events not only within the stadia — from the consistency of the football green, footballers’ dress codes, the specifics of security measures, to the commercial logos that can be displayed — but this has now expanded beyond the stadia to the entire host cities and nation. Third, the growing influence of FIFA entails a new mode of governance. The (contractual) relationships between all stakeholders are shaped by FIFA’s ability to offer a monopolized product, the World Cup. For this reason the networks created on a four-year cycle are hierarchical and it is a precondition for hosting the games that host nations and cities subject themselves to FIFA’s rules and regulation. Fourth, the modes of governance established before, during and after the FIFA World Cups are at the same time exploited by other stakeholders, and in particular by the sponsors, the media, and the sports industry. From a state perspective, the
World Cup functions as an experimental site where effective measures to police the urban population can be developed. From FIFA’s perspective, security just translates into easy but big money.

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